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Abstract 
 
SFAS 142 requires managers to estimate the current fair value of goodwill to determine 
goodwill write-offs. In promulgating the standard, the FASB predicted managers will, on 
average, use the fair value estimates to convey private information on future cash flows. 
The current fair value of goodwill is unverifiable because it depends in part on 
management’s future actions (including managers’ conceptualization and implementation 
of firm strategy). Thus, agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use the 
discretion in SFAS 142 consistent with private incentives. We test these hypotheses in a 
sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Our evidence, while 
consistent with some agency-theory derived predictions, does not confirm the private 
information hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounting for acquired goodwill has been subject to considerable debate for at 
least the past fifty years: Zeff (2005) cites disagreements over goodwill accounting rules 
as among the causes for the collapse of both the Committee on Accounting Principles and 
the Accounting Principles Board. SFAS 142, issued by the FASB in 2001, introduced a 
new approach to goodwill accounting by abolishing goodwill amortization and requiring 
all goodwill be tested periodically for impairment using estimates of its current fair value. 
In issuing SFAS 142, the FASB (2001, p. 7) predicted that the standard “will improve 
financial reporting because the financial statements of entities that acquire goodwill and 
other intangible assets will [now] better reflect the underlying economics of those assets.” 
Specifically, the FASB expected financial statements generated under the standard to 
provide “users with a better understanding of the expectations about and changes in 
[goodwill and other intangible assets] over time.” That is, the board expected managers 
will, on average, use estimates of goodwill’s fair value to convey private information on 
future cash flows. 
The SFAS 142 approach to goodwill accounting represents a significant 
innovation over prior practice and standards in that it relies solely on management 
estimates of goodwill’s current value.
1 The current fair value of goodwill is a function of 
management’s future actions, including managers’ conceptualization and implementation 
of firm strategy. As such, it is difficult to verify and audit. In effect, we expect the 
subjectivity inherent in estimating goodwill’s current fair value is greater than that in 
most other asset classes such as accounts receivables, inventories, and plant, making the 
goodwill impairment test under SFAS 142 particularly unreliable. Ex post, if a fair-value 
estimate used to justify goodwill non-impairment is not realized, a manager can claim it 
was due to factors outside her control (e.g., macroeconomic conditions). It is difficult to 
falsify such a claim in a court of law (the claim cannot be “objectively characterized as 
true or false,” Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, D.C. Cir., 1984). Thus, we hypothesize 
managers exploit the SFAS 142 goodwill impairment test consistent with private 
incentives, as predicted by agency theory.  
                                                 
1 Prior to SFAS 142, goodwill was impaired only when certain associated long-lived assets were also 
impaired (SFAS 121); moreover, goodwill was also subject to periodic amortization (APB 17). 2 
 
How managers will use the opportunity to incorporate estimates of goodwill’s fair 
value in practice is an empirical question. We investigate managers’ implementation of 
the SFAS 142 goodwill impairment test in a sample of firms with market indications of 
goodwill impairment. We examine whether goodwill non-impairment in the sample is 
associated with proxies for managers’ private information on positive future cash flows 
and/or with agency-based motives, including management’s interests in increasing their 
compensation and in shielding their reputation from the implications of a goodwill write-
off. We do not find evidence to confirm the private information argument, but we find 
some evidence consistent with agency-based predictions. We also test whether goodwill 
non-impairment varies with firm characteristics predicted by Ramanna (2008) to facilitate 
discretion under SFAS 142. These characteristics include: (1) the number and size of a 
firm’s business units; and (2) the proportion of a firm’s net assets that are unverifiable. 
We find goodwill non-impairments increase in proxies for both characteristics.  
To generate the sample of firm-years with market indications of goodwill 
impairment, we begin with firms that have both: (i) book goodwill; and (ii) equity-
market-values greater than equity-book-values. Among these firms, we retain only those 
that end each of the two subsequent fiscal years with book-to-market ratios (BTM) above 
one (where book values are calculated before the effect of any goodwill impairment, but 
after the effect of any other asset write-off). The condition BTM > 1 suggests the market 
expects goodwill impairments; however the condition can also be generated by certain 
GAAP rules on contingent losses, deferred taxes, and the impairment of (non-goodwill) 
long-lived assets.
2 To mitigate this possibility, we require sample firms to have two 
consecutive years of BTM > 1. Under such restriction, we argue goodwill is likely to be 
impaired; but our tests remain subject to the caveat that sample firms avoid write-offs 
because of certain GAAP rules. We investigate the determinants of goodwill non-
impairment at the end of the second fiscal year with BTM > 1, conditional on the firms 
having non-zero goodwill balances at the beginning of that year. There are 124 firm-years 
on COMPUSTAT that meet the sample selection criteria between the years 2003 and 
                                                 
2 In particular, among certain (non-goodwill) long-lived assets, impairment is triggered only when the 
undiscounted sum of future cash flows attributed to an asset is less than that asset’s book value. 3 
 
2006, our sample period.
3 The frequency of goodwill non-impairment in sample firm-
years (i.e., the second fiscal year with BTM > 1) is 69%.  
It is possible that managers of sample firms avoid goodwill write-offs because 
they have (or believe they have) private information on positive future cash flows. We 
identify firms likely to have favorable private information as those firms with either 
positive net share-repurchase activity or positive net insider buying. Both activities 
suggest management believes the firm is undervalued.  We examine whether sample 
firms without goodwill write-offs are more likely (than those with the write-offs) to have 
positive repurchase or insider buying activity. If this is the case, the data support the 
argument that managers’ private information drives non-impairments. We find the 
frequency of firms with positive net share-repurchase activity among non-impairers 
(24%) is statistically indistinguishable from that among impairers (24%). Further, the 
frequency of firms with positive net insider buying among non-impairers (22%) is also 
statistically indistinguishable from that among impairers (18%). 
Our use of share-repurchase and insider buying activity as indicators of managers’ 
private information is subject to an important caveat. Such activities, if interpreted by the 
market as being caused by managers exploiting favorable private information, can result 
in increased stock returns such that a firm’s BTM is no longer above 1, thus excluding 
the firm from our sample. Accordingly, our tests using these proxies can be of low power. 
To mitigate this concern, we conduct two additional tests of the private information 
hypothesis: the first using two proxies for positive private information based on linguistic 
analyses of sample firms’ 10-Ks; the second based on an ex-post analysis of sample 
firms’ stock returns.
4  
Our first linguistic proxy for positive private information, Achievement, is an 
indicator set to one when the proportion of “achievement”-related words in a sample 
firm’s 10-K is greater than that in an industry-size match. “Achievement”-related words 
are defined in Appendix B and are constructed from a similarly named category in the 
                                                 
3 Our sample begins in 2003 because that was the first full-year of SFAS 142 adoption after the standard’s 
transition adoption year; our sample ends in 2006 because financial data beyond 2006 was not available 
when we initiated this study.  
4 To further address this concern, we also investigate whether firms with share repurchases and insider 
buying are disproportionately more likely to be eliminated from our sample due to our requirement that 
sample firms end the fiscal year with BTM > 1. We do not find evidence that this is the case.  4 
 
Linguistic Inquiry & Word Count (LIWC) dictionary (Pennebaker, Francis, and Booth, 
2001).
5 High Achievement is expected to signify good news, which in turn can justify the 
non-impairment of goodwill. We find that the proportion of firms with high Achievement 
among non-impairers in the sample (57%) is statistically indistinguishable from that 
among sample impairers (54%). Thus, positive private information as manifested by an 
incidence of Achievement is unable to explain non-impairment in the sample.  
Li (2008) introduces to the accounting literature the use of the Fog Index to 
analyze 10-Ks: this index is our second linguistic proxy for positive private information. 
A Fog Index over 18 denotes unreadability and can measure attempts at obfuscation in 
the annual report. A priori, a firm with positive private information is less likely to 
engage in obfuscation, and thus less likely to generate a 10-K with a Fog Index over 18. 
If positive private information motivates non-impairment, we expect a lower prevalence 
of 10-Ks with Fog Indices over 18 among sample non-impairers than among sample 
impairers. However, we find the proportion of non-impairing sample firms with Fog 
Indices over 18 (78%) is statistically higher than that of impairing sample firms (59%).
6 
Thus, non-impairing sample firms appear to be more likely to obfuscate in 10-Ks, 
inconsistent with favorable private information motivating non-impairment in the sample. 
Inferences based on the linguistic proxies are subject to a “cheap talk” caveat; it is 
possible that the use of words to signify “achievement” or to obfuscate is costless, 
making the proxies noisy. Accordingly, our final tests of the private information 
hypothesis are based on an analysis of sample firms’ one-year-ahead stock returns. The 
purpose is to determine whether, on average, non-impairers are more likely to have 
higher one-year-ahead stock returns than impairers. If this is the case, then non-
impairment is consistent with managers having positive private information, information 
that subsequently (over one year) becomes public. For the 124 firms in our sample, stock 
returns data over the following 12 months continue to be available on CRSP for 96 firms. 
Sixty-four of these 96 firms are non-impairers in the sample year; the other 32 are 
impairers. The mean and median one-year-ahead stock returns across non-impairers and 
                                                 
5 LIWC has been used previously in computational linguistic analyses across the social and behavioral 
sciences (see Tauzczik and Pennebaker, 2009, for a review), including accounting research (e.g., Li, 2008). 
6 Throughout the paper, statistical significance is inferred at the two-tail 90% confidence level or higher. 5 
 
impairers are not statistically distinguishable (non-impairers’ mean=22.9%, 
median=12.4%; impairers’ mean=17.2%, median=13.3%).
7   
To investigate whether non-impairment is associated with motives predicted by 
agency theory to affect management’s accounting choice, we test for the cross-sectional 
variation in goodwill write-offs with proxies for CEO compensation concerns, CEO 
reputation concerns, asset-pricing concerns, exchange-delisting concerns, and concerns 
relating to debt covenant violation. Beatty and Weber (2006) predict from prior literature 
that goodwill write-offs in the initial adoption year of SFAS 142 vary in these motives; 
they find evidence consistent with some of their predictions. Our agency-based 
predictions, while derived from those in Beatty and Weber, differ where appropriate, to 
account for differences in incentives between the transition year and subsequent years. 
We find no evidence to confirm that asset-pricing concerns and exchange-delisting 
concerns are associated with goodwill write-off decisions. The result on asset-pricing 
concerns is consistent with firms’ stock prices already reflecting goodwill as impaired, a 
condition on which we attempted to select the sample.  In contrast, we find a statistically 
higher proportion of firms with covenants that are likely to be goodwill inclusive among 
sample non-impairers (78%) than among sample impairers (63%). The proportion of non-
impairing sample firms whose CEOs are likely to have goodwill-inclusive compensation 
contracts (57%) is also statistically higher than that of impairing sample firms (39%). In 
multivariate tests that control for firm-level economics and management’s private 
information, there is some further evidence that debt-covenant and CEO compensation 
incentives are associated with non-impairment.  
Also in the multivariate tests, we find evidence that non-impairment increases in 
CEO tenure. Long-tenured CEOs are more likely to have initiated the mergers that 
generated the goodwill now indicated by the market as impaired. Thus, if non-impairment 
is motivated by managers’ interests in shielding their reputation from the implications of 
                                                 
7 We use data from Thomson One Banker to follow up on the status of the remaining 28 sample firms (i.e., 
124 minus 96) that are dropped from the CRSP database in the post-sample year. A detailed analysis of 
these firms is available in Section 3. To summarize, most of these firms are acquired, delisted, or thinly 
traded; statistical comparisons within this subsample are precluded by the low n. 6 
 
a goodwill write-off, long-tenured CEOs are less likely to authorize goodwill write-offs.
8 
In the multivariate tests, none of the proxies for managers’ positive private information 
described earlier are statistically associated with non-impairment.  
The evidence in this paper is consistent with managers avoiding timely goodwill 
write-offs under SFAS 142 in circumstances where they have agency-based motives to do 
so, despite market indications that such write-offs are due. The unverifiable nature of 
fair-value estimates of goodwill makes such behavior predictable under agency theory 
(Watts, 2003; Ramanna, 2008). The evidence does not confirm the FASB’s implicit 
assumption that managers will use estimates of goodwill’s fair value to convey private 
information on future cash flows. At a minimum, the results suggest, on average in our 
sample, SFAS 142 is generating financial reports that do not reflect economic reality with 
respect to goodwill. Even if contracts completely adjust for this deficiency (which is 
unlikely), the standard imposes costs in the sample: in particular, compliance costs and 
the costs of managers continuing negative NPV operations in order to avoid write-offs. 
Our evidence is consistent with prior results on untimeliness of asset write-downs 
(e.g. Elliott and Shaw, 1988) and on the role of managerial incentives in write-down 
decisions (Francis, Hanna, and Vincent, 1996). Beatty and Weber (2006) also study the 
role of agency-based incentives in the implementation of SFAS 142, but in its adoption 
year; we extend their study to the four subsequent years, and moreover, attempt to 
determine whether managers’ private information can explain impairment decisions. 
Given the innovative nature of SFAS 142 goodwill accounting rules, our evidence 
provides new insights into whether these rules are effective. In particular, since goodwill 
is no longer amortized, write-offs are the only way managers are held accountable in the 
income statement for unallocated acquisition premiums. If, as we find, goodwill write-
offs are on average motivated by managers’ private incentives, SFAS 142 is generating 
little accountability for acquired goodwill. This finding is consistent with the observation 
that both practice prior to the existence of regulated standard setting and standards prior 
to SFAS 142 did not rely solely on fair-value-based impairment testing for goodwill 
accounting. More generally, our evidence can speak to the use of unverifiable discretion 
                                                 
8 Avoiding timely impairments to prevent debt covenant violations can also be motivated by CEO 
reputation concerns (in addition to transferring wealth from debtholders to shareholders) since failure to do 
so can be perceived as managerial incompetence.  7 
 
in financial reporting. Valuing goodwill is part of a broader shift in standard-setting 
towards valuing the firm (i.e., fair value). Our evidence suggests that fair values, when 
extended to assets with unauditable valuations, are likely to compromise financial 
reporting’s role as a management control system. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
goodwill impairment test in SFAS 142, the construction of the sample and variables, and 
the research design. Descriptive statistics, the results of univariate tests, and the results of 
construct validity tests on a sample of firms under SFAS 121 are presented in Section 3. 
That section also presents the results of multivariate tests and some additional analyses. 
Section 4 concludes with a summary and implications.  
 
2. The study 
  In this section, we first explain (in §2.1.) the SFAS 142 goodwill impairment 
rules. In §2.2., we describe the sample selection procedure and address potential caveats 
in the process. In §2.3., we discuss the possible motives (and our proxies for those 
motives) for managers to avoid impairment write-offs. In §2.4., we describe two firm 
characteristics (and their empirical proxies) that can provide managers with the ability to 
use the unverifiable discretion in SFAS 142. §2.5., describes the research design for 
multivariate tests. 
  
2.1. Unverifiable discretion in the SFAS 142 goodwill impairment test  
Prior to SFAS 142, accounting for acquired goodwill was governed by APB 17 
(AICPA, 1970) and SFAS 121 (FASB, 1995). Under these standards, firms had the 
option to account for acquisitions using the pooling-of-interests method, thereby avoiding 
goodwill recognition altogether. Goodwill, when recognized, was subject to periodic 
amortization.  Goodwill was also subject to impairment, but only when certain associated 
long-lived assets were also impaired. The test for asset impairment was based on 
comparing undiscounted future cash flows to book values. SFAS 142 abolished goodwill 
amortization and required instead an impairment-only approach to goodwill. Further, 
SFAS 142 no longer tied the goodwill impairment decision to impairment decisions on 8 
 
related long-lived assets. Instead, goodwill is now impaired based on a comparison of a 
fair-value estimate of goodwill with the book value of goodwill.  
SFAS 142 lays out the following procedure for goodwill impairment. All acquired 
goodwill is initially allocated among the “reporting units” of a firm. Generally, a 
reporting unit is an operating segment, or a component thereof, if that component 
constitutes a business with discrete financial information that is regularly reviewed by 
management (SFAS 142, §30). Goodwill is tested for impairment at this reporting unit 
level. For a given reporting unit, the goodwill impairment test is a two-step procedure as 
described below. 
1.  The reporting unit’s total fair value is estimated by management (or their 
agents). This fair value is then compared to the unit’s total book value. If the 
fair value is greater than the book value, Step 2 is skipped and no impairment 
loss is recognized.  
2.  If the unit’s estimated fair value is less than its book value, the fair value of 
the unit’s goodwill is estimated. The fair value of goodwill is defined as the 
difference between the unit’s total fair value (from Step 1) and the sum of the 
fair values of the unit’s non-goodwill net assets. The fair value of goodwill is 
then compared to the book value of goodwill. Any excess of goodwill’s book 
value over its fair value is recorded as the unit’s impairment loss (no loss or 
gain is recognized if the goodwill’s fair value estimate exceeds its book 
value). Goodwill impairment losses from the firm’s various reporting units are 
aggregated and reported as a separate above-the-line item in the income 
statement. 
 
There are three layers of discretion in the impairment procedure described above. 
First, acquired goodwill, which represents rents expected from an acquisition, must be 
allocated across reporting units; second, the discounted future value of those reporting 
units must be estimated; and third, the current value of the units’ net assets (including 
non-goodwill intangibles) must be estimated. The discretion in the first two layers is 
difficult to audit in that it is ex post unverifiable. A similar argument can be made about 9 
 
the discretion in the third layer, particularly with regards to current-value estimates of 
thinly traded assets and liabilities.  
While there is discretion associated with estimating accruals in nearly all areas of 
accounting, we argue the subjectivity inherent in estimating the current fair value of 
goodwill is greater than that in most other asset classes such as accounts receivables, 
inventories, and plant. There are two bases for this argument. (1) Uncertainty in future 
cash flows: The uncertainty in future cash flows associated with capitalized goodwill is 
higher (relative to other capitalized assets) because goodwill represents a present-value 
estimate of future rents. The realization of those rents depends on several unpredictable 
factors such as the firm’s competitive position vis-à-vis its customers, its suppliers, its 
employees, and the regulatory environment. (2) Moral hazard: The ability to realize the 
value embedded in book goodwill is contingent on management’s future effort. Allowing 
managers to fair-value goodwill can result in managers receiving compensation (by 
overstating profits through non- impairment) on projects that are likely to fail. When that 
failure does occur, managers cannot be held accountable because it is impossible to 
objectively assess whether the failure was due to management actions.
9  
 
2.2. Sample selection  
Our objective is to test whether firms with the ability and motives to manage 
SFAS 142 goodwill impairment losses actually do so. To do this, we need to identify a 
sample of firm-years where goodwill is likely impaired. We use the presence of book 
goodwill and the time-series of firms’ book-to-market ratios (BTM) to select our sample 
(where, as noted earlier, BTM is calculated after the effect of all non-goodwill write-offs, 
but before the effect of any goodwill impairment). We begin with firms that have equity-
book-values < equity-market-values and at least $1 million of book goodwill at the end of 
year t-2. Then, we retain only those firms that end year t-1 with BTM > 1. When a firm 
goes from having equity-book-values < equity-market-values (in year t-2) to having BTM 
> 1 (in year t-1), there is likely an overstatement in its book value, suggesting a write-off 
                                                 
9 Unlike moral hazard implicit in valuing items like net accounts receivable (where subsequent 
management effort on collecting receivables is observable and can be entered into evidence), it is very 
difficult to make the case (in the event of ex post litigation) that goodwill losses were due to management 
inaction (rather than macroeconomic conditions). That is, the claim cannot be “objectively characterized as 
true or false” (Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, D.C. Cir., 1984), the legal standard for verifiability. 10 
 
is due. However, such a change can be associated with no write-off if the decline in 
market value is attributable to circumstances where GAAP does not require recognizing a 
contemporaneous expense (e.g., certain contingencies, deferred taxes, pensions, etc.).
10 
Further, GAAP rules on the impairment of certain (non-goodwill) long-lived assets can 
also result in firms with BTM > 1 not taking write-offs (under these rules, impairment is 
triggered only when the undiscounted sum of future cash flows attributed to an asset is 
less than that asset’s book value). 
To minimize the circumstances where the change from equity-book-values < 
equity-market-values (in year t-2) to BTM > 1 (in year t-1) is not associated with GAAP 
requirements for a contemporaneous write-off, we limit our sample to firms where BTM 
stays above one for an additional fiscal year (year t). Additionally, we require that these 
firms begin year t with a non-zero goodwill balance. We argue that firms with two 
successive years of BTM > 1 are likely to have impairment in net assets. Further, since 
the firms have goodwill on their books, we expect at least some of that write-off to be in 
goodwill. Note if a firm takes an adequate write-off from an account other than goodwill, 
it is, by selection, not in our sample because its BTM should no longer be greater than 
one. We intentionally exclude negative book-value firms and firms with BTM < 1 from 
our analysis since the case for impairment in their goodwill is less compelling. 
We examine the determinants of goodwill impairment in the second fiscal year 
with BTM > 1 (i.e., in year t). There are 124 “year t” observations in the COMPUSTAT 
database that meet our sample criteria. The observations are from years 2003 through 
2006. SFAS 142 was promulgated in June 2001 and mandatory adoption was required for 
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001. We exclude the initial adoption year 
(2002) from our year t analysis of impairments because in 2002 firms were permitted to 
ascribe goodwill impairments below-the-line to a “change in accounting principle;” in all 
subsequent years, impairments are charged above-the-line, to “income from continuing 
operations.” Beatty and Weber (2006) find evidence that absent contracting incentives, 
firms accelerate impairments into the adoption year to qualify for below-the-line 
                                                 
10 Even in such circumstances, assuming the decline in market value is permanent, auditors are likely to 
want managers to take timely write-offs. 11 
 
accounting treatment. Thus, the factors that facilitate adoption-year impairments likely 
differ from the factors that facilitate impairments in subsequent years.
11  
One can argue that the sample selection procedure is biased towards identifying 
firms that are not representative of the general population. Firms with two consecutive 
years of BTM>1 are uncompetitive or are otherwise suffering from serious economic 
woes that make accounting compliance issues secondary. The incidence and properties of 
non-compliance in our sample are therefore not representative of accounting practice in 
the general population. An analogy to this argument is a criticism of a study that 
documents properties of brake failures in cars that travel over 50 mph in a 30 mph zone 
on the basis that most drivers do not engage in such activity. Cars likely do much more 
damage when their brakes fail at over 50 mph, so failures at this speed are likely to 
represent a large share of the costs of brake failure and thus be of interest to stewards of 
automobile safety. Similarly, we argue evidence on the properties of SFAS 142 non-
compliance among firms with two consecutive years of BTM > 1 is likely to be of 
interest to managers, investors, and regulators. SFAS 142 is an impairment standard and 
our sample represents firms whose goodwill is very likely impaired.  We argue this is 
where an effective impairment standard should work.  
 
2.3. Motives to manage goodwill impairment losses 
2.3.1. Managers’ private information on positive future cash flows 
Standard setters imply that the goodwill impairment test in SFAS 142 allows 
managers, on average, to convey private information on future cash flows. In explaining 
how SFAS 142 improves financial reporting, the FASB (2001, p. 7) argues the standard 
provides “users with a better understanding of the expectations about and changes in 
[goodwill and other intangible assets] over time.” If this is the case, managers’ failure to 
impair goodwill can be attributed to information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders, in particular, situations in which managers have favorable private 
information on future cash flows. We identify firms whose managers are likely to have 
positive private information as those with either positive net share-repurchase activity or 
                                                 
11 Firms that accelerated impairments into the adoption year to create write-off loss reserves are unlikely to 
be in our sample since we filter out firms without positive goodwill balances. 12 
 
positive net insider buying as of the end of year t (i.e., the second full fiscal-year with 
BTM>1). Both activities can be interpreted as rational responses by managers to 
situations where their stock is undervalued. We code firms with positive net share-
repurchase activity using the indicator variable Repurchase; firms with positive net 
insider buying using the indicator variable Inside; and firms with either of these two 
activities using the indicator variable InfoAsym. In our tests, we examine the univariate 
association of non-impairment in our sample with InfoAsym, Repurchase, and Inside, and 
examine in multivariate regressions the cross-sectional variation in impairment decisions 
with InfoAsym. 
InfoAsym, Repurchase, and Inside are likely to be effective measures of 
managers’ positive private information to the extent that managers are not so cash 
constrained that they cannot engage in share buying activity. Moreover,  such share 
buying activity, if interpreted by the market as being caused by managers exploiting 
favorable private information, can result in increased stock returns such that a firm’s 
BTM is no longer above 1. In this case, the firm will not be in our sample, and our tests 
using InfoAsym and associated proxies can be of low power.
12 To generate a measure of 
managers’ positive private information that is not limited by these concerns, we examine 
the extent to which managers discuss their “achievements” in the year t form 10K filing. 
More “achievements” can signify good news, which in turn can justify the non-
impairment of goodwill. The Linguistic Inquiry & Word Count (LIWC) software 
(Pennebaker  et al., 2001) allows researchers to assess the proportion of words in a 
document that are associated with “achievement.” LIWC has been used previously in 
computational linguistic analyses across the social and behavioral sciences (see Tauzczik 
and Pennebaker, 2009, for a review), including accounting research (e.g., Li, 2008). 
LIWC contains an internal dictionary of English words related to achievement (among 
                                                 
12 To investigate this concern further, we look at firms eliminated by our sample selection procedure for 
evidence that this group has a disproportionately higher incidence of positive private information (i.e., 
InfoAsym=1). In particular, we analyze all firms with year “t” in the 2003–2006 period, and with BTMt-2 < 
1 and BTMt-1 > 1. There are 366 such firms (of these, 124 firms also have BTMt > 1; these are the firms in 
our primary sample). We are interested in determining if among the 366 firms, those with BTMt > 1 (124 
firms) have a lower frequency of InfoAsym=1 than those with BTMt < 1 (242 firms). The frequency of 
firms with InfoAsym=1 among the BTMt > 1 sample is 41.1% (51 of 124 firms), which is actually higher 
than that among the BTMt < 1 sample, 28.5% (69 of 242 firms); the comparison is statistically significant 
(chi-square p-value is 0.015). The result is inconsistent with the concern that our sample selection 
procedure disproportionately excludes firms with positive private information.  13 
 
other categories): the dictionary has been validated by having independent evaluators 
score hundreds of test documents, comparing their results to those of the LIWC software 
(Pennebaker and King, 1999). Because the “achievement” dictionary in LIWC also 
contains words that are antonyms to achievement (e.g., “beaten,” “defeated,” 
“unsuccessful”), for all subsequent tests we edit the LIWC dictionary to exclude these 
antonyms.
13 The “achievement’ dictionary used in our tests is reproduced in Appendix B.  
To construct our measure of achievement (hereafter denoted, Achievement), we 
define a dummy variable set to one if the proportion of “achievement”-related words (as 
defined in Appendix B) in the sample firm’s year t 10K is greater than the corresponding 
proportion in its size-match. The size-match is a firm in the same 3-digit NAICS industry 
with the closest year t-1 sales. We use a size-match in defining Achievement because the 
raw proportion of “achievement”-related words as output by LIWC is by itself difficult to 
objectively assess. 
Achievement can be a noisy measure for private information if use of words 
connoting “achievement” in the 10-K is costless, i.e., if Achievement is “cheap talk.” 
Accordingly, we develop an additional linguistics-based proxy for managers’ positive 
private information: the proxy is denoted Fog. Li (2008) introduces to the accounting 
literature the use of the Fog Index to analyze 10-Ks. A Fog Index over 18 denotes 
unreadability and can measure attempts at obfuscation in the annual report. We define the 
variable Fog as a dummy set to one if the Fog Index of a sample firm-year’s 10-K is 
greater than 18. A priori, a firm with positive private information is less likely to engage 
in obfuscation and generate an unreadable 10-K, i.e., a value of Fog=1. Thus, if positive 
private information motivates non-impairment, we expect a lower prevalence of Fog=1 
among sample non-impairers than among sample impairers.  
If a legitimate justification of non-impairment requires complex language that the 
Fog Index captures as “obfuscation,” our tests based on Fog are confounded. 
Accordingly, in a final series of tests of the private information hypothesis, we study 
sample firms’ one-year-ahead stock returns. In particular, we investigate whether sample 
non-impairers are more likely to have, on average, higher one-year-ahead stock returns 
than sample impairers. If this is the case, then non-impairment is consistent with 
                                                 
13 Reported results are insensitive to using the LIWC achievement dictionary as originally published. 14 
 
managers having positive private information that is revealed publicly over the following 
one year. We report on the results of tests based on proxies described herein in Section 3.  
 
2.3.2. Incentives predicted by agency theory 
Agency theory predicts managers (all else equal) will on average use 
unverifiability in accounting judgment, such as that in SFAS 142 impairment tests, to 
opportunistically manage financial reports (Watts, 2003; Ramanna, 2008). Beatty and 
Weber (2006) study firms’ agency-based motives to delay goodwill losses in the SFAS 
142 transition period. They argue from prior literature that the decision to delay goodwill 
losses is based on: debt and compensation contracts written on goodwill accounts (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986), management reputation (Francis et al., 1996), and equity-asset-
pricing concerns (i.e., the responsiveness of stock prices to goodwill-inclusive earnings, 
Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001). Beatty and Weber also hypothesize that exchange 
delisting concerns can affect the impairment loss recognition decision when delisting is 
triggered by goodwill-inclusive covenants. In empirical tests, they find support for all 
motives except equity-asset-pricing concerns. Our tests on the variation in goodwill 
impairment across agency-based motives are based on predictions in Beatty and Weber, 
with some important modifications to account for differences in incentives between the 
transition year and subsequent years, as noted below. 
1.  Contracting motives: 
(a) The costs of violating debt covenants (CovDebt): Our proxy for the cost of 
violating debt covenants is the product of the ratio of current period debt to prior 
period assets and an indicator if the firm has an outstanding net worth or net 
income based debt covenant. Net worth and net income based covenants are 
goodwill inclusive; thus, the existence of such covenants in a firm is likely to 
incent management decisions on goodwill write-offs. For firms with debt 
contracts written on accounting numbers, violating a covenant will be more 
costly, the greater its leverage. Thus, we multiply the covenant indicator variable 
by leverage.
14 Beatty and Weber measure the debt-covenant incentives on write-
                                                 
14 Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that leverage is a relatively noisy proxy for the probability of debt 
covenant violation; however, holding constant this probability, leverage is likely a good proxy for the cost 15 
 
off decisions using a firm-specific covenant slack variable that attempts to capture 
the significance of a firm’s goodwill account balance to meeting its net worth 
covenant requirements. We cannot use a similar variable because numerical data 
on the net worth covenant requirements for our sample are not available (Beatty 
and Weber’s sample is selected in part on the availability of these data; our 
sample is selected on market expectations of a goodwill write-off, resulting in 
smaller firms that are unlikely to disclose detailed covenant data). Our proxy on 
debt-covenant incentives is admittedly weaker than that in Beatty and Weber, 
potentially reducing the power of our tests.   
(b) Managers’ accounting-based compensation (Bonus): Our proxy for managers’ 
accounting-based compensation concerns is an indicator for whether a firm’s 
CEO received a cash bonus during the year in question. Murphy (1999) reports 
that accounting-based compensation is usually paid out as a cash bonus and that 
accounting-based compensation contracts are usually written on net income (and 
so include the effect of goodwill write-offs). Thus, we expect sample firms with 
Bonus=1 to be less likely to take goodwill write-offs. In the case of compensation 
incentives as well, our prediction and proxy differ from that in Beatty and Weber. 
In their study, Beatty and Weber examine how the decision to accelerate goodwill 
write-offs to the SFAS 142 transition year depends on the presence of 
management compensation contracts that exclude special items (transition year 
goodwill write-offs are classified as a special item). Since we are interested in the 
role of management compensation incentives in write-offs on an ongoing basis, 
the inclusion or exclusion of special items in compensation contracts is irrelevant 
to us.  
(c) The firm being traded on an exchange with accounting-based delisting 
requirements (Delist): Beatty and Weber report that firms listed on the NASDAQ 
and AMEX are subject to goodwill-inclusive accounting-based delisting 
requirements. OTC listed firms do not have such delisting requirements, while 
NYSE listed firms face delisting based on subjective criteria. To capture exchange 
                                                                                                                                                 
of debt covenant violation (the more debt a firm has, the more costly it will be to renegotiate contracts once 
covenants are violated). Further, we expect the probability of covenant violation in our sample (firms with 
two years of BTM > 1) is relatively high.  16 
 
delisting concerns, we create a dummy variable, Delist, set to one if the firm 
trades on NASDAQ or AMEX; zero otherwise. This variable is similar to that in 
the Beatty and Weber study. 
2.  Reputation motives, managers’ interests in shielding their reputations from the 
implications of a goodwill write-off (Tenure): Beatty and Weber argue that 
among firms with book goodwill, CEOs with longer tenures are more likely to 
have been involved in the acquisitions that generated that goodwill. To avoid 
reputation costs, such long-tenured CEOs are less likely to take goodwill write-
offs. In our study, as in Beatty and Weber, CEO tenure is measured as the number 
of years the incumbent CEO has held that office.  
3.  Valuation motives, equity-asset-pricing concerns (AsstPrc): We use the earnings 
response coefficient (ERC) to measure the capitalization of earnings in returns. If 
equity-asset-pricing concerns affect managers’ accounting decisions (e.g., Fields 
et al., 2001), including their impairment decisions, non-impairment is likely to 
increase in ERC. Following Beatty and Weber, we define ERC for a given firm-
year as the coefficient from a regression of the firm’s share price on its operating 
income using at least 16 and up to 20 quarters of data prior to the firm-year. 
Importantly, in our setting, in contrast to that in Beatty and Weber, the prediction 
on AsstPrc’s impact on write-off decisions is more ambiguous. This is because we 
attempt to select our sample on market indications of impaired goodwill; if we are 
successful in this regard, our sample firms’ stock prices will already reflect 
goodwill as impaired, mitigating the incentives generated by asset-pricing 
concerns.   
 
2.4. Financial characteristics that facilitate unverifiable discretion under SFAS 142 
In the prior section, we discussed some of the potential motives for impairment 
management. In addition to having the motives to manage impairment losses, firms must 
have the ability to do so. In this section, we discuss how the rules in SFAS 142 can make 
it easier for firms with certain financial characteristics to manage impairment losses. 
From Ramanna (2008), below we identify two firm financial characteristics that increase 17 
 
firms’ unverifiable discretion to determine impairment under SFAS 142: the number and 
size of reporting units; and the unverifiable net assets in reporting units.  
 
2.4.1. Number and size of reporting units 
When a firm recognizes goodwill in an acquisition, SFAS 142 requires the firm 
allocate that goodwill among the reporting units that benefit from the acquisition. If the 
rents that goodwill represents are generated jointly by the units, any allocation is arbitrary 
and there is no way to meaningfully allocate goodwill: any one allocation scheme is as 
good as another (Watts 2003; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007).  For a given firm, the 
larger the number of reporting units and the larger the size of those units relative to 
acquired goodwill, the greater the flexibility in allocating goodwill. This initial flexibility 
in goodwill allocation provides the opportunity to later avoid or overstate impairment 
losses. Goodwill can be allocated to units where subsequent impairment can be masked 
by the units’ internally generated unrecognized gains or losses. Managers can allocate 
goodwill either to low growth units to accelerate impairment (a big bath), or to high 
growth units (with existing unrecorded internally generated growth options) to delay 
impairment. The larger and more numerous the reporting units, the greater is 
management’s flexibility in determining future impairment losses.
15  
 
Empirical Proxies for Number and Size of Reporting Units  
Ln(Seg): Empirical data on “the number and size of reporting units” are not 
readily available. SFAS 131, however, requires firms to disclose data on their business 
segments. We use the number of business segments as our proxy for the number and size 
of reporting units.  Reporting units are at least as numerous as business segments (SFAS 
142, §30). Thus, using business segments as proxies understates the number of reporting 
units. This, in turn, biases against finding an association between impairment delays and 
the number of reporting units. 
                                                 
15 Once goodwill is allocated among reporting units, reallocation in future years is not permitted (SFAS 
142, §34). Thus, in principle, the “number and size of reporting units” provides flexibility only at the time 
of acquisition. However, firms can reorganize their reporting structures in future years (SFAS 142, §36), 
effectively leading to a reallocation in acquired goodwill. 18 
 
HHI: We also use a variant of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a proxy 
for the number and size of reporting units. We calculate each firm’s HHI as follows.  



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i s HHI
1
2) (;   
where n is the number of business segments in the firm and si is the ratio of the i
th 
business-segments’ sales to total firm sales. Thus, HHI is an index of segment 
concentration within a firm. HHI ranges from zero to one. If a firm has only one segment, 
then its HHI is one; if a firm has several segments, but one of them is much larger than 
the others, its HHI is close to one. As the number of segments increases, and as segments 
become of similar size, the firm’s HHI gets closer to zero. Thus, an HHI close to zero 
indicates a firm with several equally sized segments, while an HHI close to one indicates 
a firm with a few disproportionately sized segments. In using HHI to proxy for the 
number and size of reporting units, note that low HHI (several equally sized segments) 
offers the greater flexibility associated with more and larger reporting units, while high 
HHI (few disproportionately sized segments) offers the lesser flexibility associated with 
fewer and smaller reporting units. Thus, HHI is expected to be negatively associated with 
Ln(Seg). 
 
2.4.2. Unverifiable net assets in reporting units 
If a reporting unit fails Step 1 of the impairment test (i.e., if the unit’s fair value to 
book value ratio is less than one), management must estimate the fair value of the unit’s 
goodwill under Step 2. That estimate is calculated as the difference between the unit’s 
total fair value (from Step 1) and the fair value of the unit’s constituent net assets 
(excluding book goodwill). Thus, in Step 2, managers must obtain fair-value appraisals 
for all of the unit’s assets and liabilities. For units that have a larger proportion of net 
assets (excluding goodwill) without readily observable market values (hereafter, 
unverifiable net assets), assessing fair values of net assets introduces additional 
subjectivity in determining impairment losses. Subjectivity in appraising the fair values 
of net assets other than goodwill results in subjectivity in estimating the fair value of 
goodwill, and consequently in estimating the amount of impairment loss. The subjectivity 19 
 
suggests that units with more unverifiable net assets have greater ability to manage 
goodwill impairment losses.  
 
Empirical Proxies for Unverifiable Net Assets in Reporting Units  
UNA: We compute the ratio of [Cash + All Investments and Advances – Debt – 
Preferred Equity] to [Assets – Liabilities]. The denominator in this ratio is total net assets, 
while the numerator is intended to proxy for that component of net assets whose fair-
values are likely most verifiable (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005). Thus, 
this ratio is intended to capture the verifiability of net assets (VNA). Items excluded from 
the numerator include plant and equipment, receivables, payables, inventories, advances, 
etc. Fair-value estimates of these items are likely less verifiable than cash, investments, 
debt, and preferred equity. Thus, as the VNA ratio decreases, subjectivity in estimating 
the fair value of goodwill is expected to increase. To obtain a measure that increases in 
the subjectivity of estimating the fair value of goodwill, we multiply VNA by -1. We then 
rank the resulting value in-sample and denote it UNA, where “UNA” refers to the 
unverifiability of net assets.
16  
IndLev: A potential problem with UNA is that it homogenizes the net assets 
considered unverifiable across all industries. Fabricant (1936) reports that in a sample of 
208 large listed industrial US firms for the period 1925-1934, property, plant, and 
equipment write-ups were more numerous (70) than investment write-ups (43). Watts 
(2006, p. 54) argues the property, plant, and equipment written up were likely to be 
general, non-firm-specific assets for which market prices were more observable. If that is 
true, UNA measures unverifiability with error. Consequently, as an alternate proxy for the 
unverifiability of net assets, we also use the firm’s industry-average debt-to-assets.  
Leverage can be a good proxy for non-firm-specific assets (Myers, 1977; Smith 
and Watts, 1992). Such assets are more likely to have verifiable fair-value estimates. At 
the firm level, leverage is a noisy measure of assets-in-place because it also proxies for 
distress (especially likely in our sample where all firms have BTM > 1). Industry mean 
                                                 
16 In unreported tests, we find the VNA ratio has high in-sample variance; we also find relatively high 
kurtosis in this variable, suggesting the high variance is due to a few extreme observations. To mitigate the 
effect of such observations (and to avoid trimming-induced data loss in what is a relatively small dataset), 
we use in-sample ranks in computing UNA. 20 
 
leverage, however, can average out the firm-specific distress component of leverage, 
leaving us with a proxy for assets-in-place. The higher the industry’s average leverage, 
the more likely the nature of assets in a firm are such that they can be reliably valued; and 
thus, the less likely the unverifiability of net assets. We define “industry” as four-digit 
NAICS codes, and rank all such industries by mean leverage. We use the industry mean 
leverage rank, IndLev, as a proxy for verifiability of firm assets. Thus, we expect the 
subjectivity generated by unverifiable net assets to decrease in IndLev. 
 
In addition to the two financial characteristics described above (i.e., the number 
and size of reporting units and the unverifiable net assets in reporting units), Ramanna 
(2008) describes a third firm attribute that can facilitate write-off management: the fair-
value-to-book-value ratio (FTB) of reporting units. Under Step 1 of SFAS 142, 
impairment losses are recognized only when the unit’s estimated fair value is less than 
the book value of its net assets. This step implicitly assigns all of the difference between 
a unit’s fair value and its book value to acquired goodwill. However, at least two other 
factors can be responsible for this difference. First, internally generated growth options 
can increase the unit’s fair value without increasing its book value. Second, the book 
value of the unit’s recorded net assets can be below their market value.  These two factors 
mean that the value implicitly allotted to acquired goodwill in Step 1 of the SFAS 142 
impairment test can be overstated. Units with high FTB ratios can avoid impairment of 
acquired goodwill even when that goodwill is impaired because internally generated rents 
and understatement of net assets can absorb any drop in goodwill value. We do not 
explicitly test this hypothesis. We cannot directly observe FTB ratios, and the best 
available proxy for FTB ratios—firm-wide market-to-book ratios—is used to select our 
sample. In other words, since our sample only consists of firms with BTM > 1, testing 
whether firms with high FTB are avoiding impairment losses is not possible. This 
suggests that the extent of non-impairment documented in this paper is a lower bound on 
the total avoidance occurring under SFAS 142.  
 
2.5. Research design 21 
 
To examine the determinants of goodwill non-impairment in the sample in a 
multivariate setting, we estimate the following regression for all firm-years “i.”  
Impi = Intercept + βk*(Private information motivesi) + βl*(Contracting motivesi) 
+βm*(Reputation motivesi) + βn*(Valuation motivesi) + βo*(Reporting flexibilityi) 
+ βp*(Control variablesi) + εi … (1) 
 
In the above equation, Impi measures a firm’s goodwill impairment at the end of 
year t (i.e., the second full fiscal-year with BTM>1), scaled by beginning-of-period 
assets. If impairments are not reported on COMPUSTAT (i.e., if impairments are coded 
as “missing” or “combined” with other data), we assume impairments are zero.
17 The set 
of “private information motives” is either InfoAsym alone or (in a separate regression) 
InfoAsym together with the content-analysis based variables, Achievement and Fog. The 
content-analysis based variables are excluded from the first regression specification 
because they cannot be computed for six firms in the sample due to limitations in 
obtaining these firms’ 10-K filings.
18  
The set of “contracting motives” is CovDebt,  Bonus, and Delist; “reputation 
motives” is Tenure; and “valuation motives” is AsstPrc. AsstPrc cannot be estimated for 
38 of the 124 sample firms due to data restrictions and so is excluded from the primary 
regression specification. The set of “reporting flexibility” proxies is each of four 
combinations (estimated across four separate regressions) of a goodwill allocation 
variable (i.e., ln(Seg) or HHI) and an unverifiability variable (i.e., UNA or IndLev). The 
control variables from equation (1) are as follows.  
(a) Size:  The natural log of beginning-of-period assets. 
(b) PropGw: The ratio of beginning-of-period goodwill to prior year assets. 
(c) BHRet: The “year t” buy-and-hold return. 
(d) NumQtrBTM>1: The number of quarters in “year t” with BTM > 1. 
 
 Size and PropGw are likely proxies for the magnitude of goodwill write-offs, 
while BHRet and NumQtrBTM>1 are likely proxies for the economic necessity of a 
                                                 
17 We tested this assumption for a random sample of ten firms by searching 10-K filings for impairments 
data. We found no instance where our assumption was inconsistent with data in the 10-K.  
18 These six firms did not file 10-Ks with the SEC within eight months of their fiscal-year ends.  22 
 
write-off. Unless otherwise mentioned, all variables in our analyses are measured at the 
end of “year t.” See Appendix A for a consolidated description of all variables. Parameter 
estimates in the multivariate regression are computed using ordinary least squares and 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity as suggested by White (1980).  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Sample descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all variables in our analyses. The median 
impairment (Imp) in our sample is zero, while the mean is 4.7% of beginning-of-period 
assets. About 24% of sample firms engage in net share repurchase activities in year t, 
while about 21% engage in net insider buying. The mean value of InfoAsym is 0.4113 
(i.e., about 41% of the sample engage in either repurchase or insider buying activities). 
Mean Achievement, the proportion of sample firms with more “achievement” words than 
their matches, is 0.5593. Mean Fog, the proportion of the sample with unreadable 10-Ks, 
is 0.7203.
19  
Turning to the agency-theory based proxies, the median firm’s CovDebt (i.e., the 
product of firm leverage and an indicator if the firm has an outstanding net worth or net 
income based debt covenant) is 0.1341. Nearly 52% of CEOs of sample firms received a 
bonus in year t and the median (mean) CEO was in office for 4 years (5.5 years) by the 
end of year t. Over 51% of sample firms have delisting-based incentives to avoid 
impairments. 
The median value of ln(Seg) is 0.693, suggesting that the median firm in our 
sample has two business segments. The median HHI in the sample 0.768, suggesting that 
most firms in the sample are not concentrated in one segment. The median industry-
leverage rank for firms in the sample is 1192 (the highest possible rank in COMPUSTAT 
is 2133). The median value of UNA is 63 by construction.  
The median (mean) firm in our sample has $210 million ($273 million) in assets 
and 14.1% (25.6%) of its assets in goodwill. Sample firms experience a median (mean) 
year-t buy-and-hold return of -7.2% (5.1%). The median firm closed each of its four 
                                                 
19 Li (2008, p. 227) reports that the 25
th percentile value of the Fog Index in a broad sample of firms on 
COMPUSTAT is 18.44, suggesting the proportion of COMPUSTAT firms with unreadable 10-Ks is over 
75%. 23 
 
quarters in year t with BTM > 1, while on average, firms in the sample experienced 3.49 
quarters of BTM > 1 in year t. 
 
3.2. Association of sample non-impairment with private information  
Table 2 reports the results of univariate frequency tests of association between 
goodwill non-impairment and the proxies for managers’ private information on positive 
future cash flows. As noted earlier, there are 124 firms in COMPUSTAT meeting our 
sample criteria. Of these, 31% (38 firms) record goodwill impairments in year t, the 
second full fiscal-year with BTM>1; 69% (86 firms) do not. It is possible that managers 
avoid goodwill write-offs due to private information on positive future cash flows. To test 
this explanation, we examine whether non-impairment firms are more likely to show 
evidence of net repurchase or insider buying activity (i.e., InfoAsym=1). Panel A of Table 
2 reports that the frequency of firms with InfoAsym=1 among non-impairers (42%) is 
statistically indistinguishable from that among impairers (39%). The chi-square statistic 
for the 2x2 comparison has a p-value of 0.8034.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we report on the association of non-impairment with 
InfoAsym among sample firms with only one business segment. Earlier, we argued that 
firms with large numbers of, and large-sized, reporting units are more likely to be able to 
avoid impairments by strategically allocating goodwill to units with internally generated 
rents. If this is the case, it is useful to determine if, in single-segment firms, 
unverifiability in net assets provides adequate discretion to avoid write-offs. Panel B 
reports the year-t frequency of non-impairment among single-segment sample firms is 
69% (36 of 52 firms), the same as the frequency of non-impairment among all sample 
firms. Further, among single-segment firms, the frequency of firms with InfoAsym=1 
among non-impairers (39%) is statistically indistinguishable from that among impairers 
(31%); p-value is 0.5975. Thus, non-impairment does not appear to be limited to multi-
segment firms, nor does the evidence confirm that non-impairment in single-segment 
firms is motivated by managers’ private information on future cash flows. 
Positive net insider buying is arguably a stronger measure of favorable 
information asymmetry (between managers and shareholders) than InfoAsym (recall, 
InfoAsym is firms with either positive net share repurchase activity or positive net insider 24 
 
buying). We thus test whether goodwill non-impairment frequency is associated with 
favorable information asymmetry when the latter is defined only by positive net share 
repurchase (Repurchase) or by positive net insider buying (Inside). The results are 
reported in Panels C and D of Table 2. We find: (1) the frequency of firms with 
Repurchase=1 among non-impairers (24%) is statistically indistinguishable from that 
among impairers (24%); (2) the frequency of firms with Inside=1 among non-impairers 
(22%) is statistically indistinguishable from that among impairers (18%). The p-values 
for the comparisons are 0.9298 and 0.6430, respectively. Overall, the data cannot confirm 
that non-impairment in the sample is due to management’s possession of favorable 
private information, at least as based on share repurchase and insider buying activity. 
We next turn to tests of the private information hypothesis that are based on 
content-analyses of firms’ 10-Ks. In these tests, six of the 124 sample firms are excluded 
because they failed to file 10-Ks within eight months of their fiscal year-ends. In Panel E 
of Table 2, we find that the proportion of firms with high Achievement (i.e., 
Achievement=1) among non-impairers in the sample (57%) is statistically 
indistinguishable from that among sample impairers (54%); the p-value is 0.7812. Thus, 
positive private information as manifested by an incidence of Achievement is unable to 
explain non-impairment in the sample. In Panel F of Table 2, we report on the association 
of goodwill non-impairment with Fog. If positive private information motivates non-
impairment, we expect a lower prevalence of Fog=1 among sample non-impairers than 
among sample impairers. However, we find the proportion of non-impairing sample firms 
with Fog=1 (78%) is statistically higher than that of impairing sample firms (59%). The 
p-value on this comparison is 0.0397. Thus, while we find an association between non-
impairment and Fog, the relation is in the opposite direction as that predicted by the 
private information hypothesis.  
The tests of the private information hypothesis reported on thus far are subject to 
certain caveats, as discussed in Section 2. To mitigate concerns generated by these 
caveats, we also investigate whether sample non-impairers have, on average, higher one-
year-ahead stock returns than sample impairers. If this is the case, then non-impairment is 
consistent with managers having positive private information that is revealed publicly, 25 
 
and incorporated into stock prices, over the following one year. The results of tests based 
on one-year-ahead stock returns are presented in Table 3.  
For the 124 firms in our sample, stock returns data over the following 12 months 
continue to be available on CRSP for 96 firms. These firms are classified as “Active, 
CRSP” in Table 3. Sixty-four of these 96 firms are identified as non-impairers in our 
sample year; the other 32 are impairers. As the data in the table show, the mean one-year-
ahead return for “Active, CRSP” firms not taking goodwill impairment (n=64) is higher 
than that for such firms who take goodwill impairment (n=32). However, the opposite is 
true when comparing the medians across the two groups. Neither comparison is 
statistically significant. Thus, we cannot reject the null that there is no difference in one-
year-ahead returns between goodwill impairers and non-impairers. These data are 
inconsistent with the proposition that goodwill non-impairment in the sample year is due 
to managers’ private information, information that subsequently (over one year) becomes 
public and is incorporated into stock prices. 
For the remaining 28 sample firms without one-year-ahead returns data on CRSP 
(i.e., 124 minus 96), we attempt to gather the returns data from Thomson One Banker. 
Fifteen of the 28 firms have 12-month-ahead stock price information available on 
Thomson. From this price information, we compute the 12-month-ahead stock returns; 
these firms are classified as “Active, not CRSP” in Table 3. We are not certain why these 
firms, previously covered by CRSP, are dropped in the year ahead. Irregular price 
reporting and low-volume trades, as reported in Thomson, suggest that these firms are 
thinly traded during the year ahead. Twelve of the 15 firms are identified as non-
impairers in our sample year; the other three are impairers. Among “Active, not CRSP” 
firms, the mean and median one-year-ahead returns for firms not taking goodwill 
impairment (n=12) are higher than those for firms taking goodwill impairment (n=3). 
However, the comparisons are not statistically significant, and moreover, the number of 
observations among impairers in this group (n=3) is too small to facilitate reliable 
statistical inferences. 
A further six of the 28 firms without one-year-ahead returns data on CRSP have 
stock price data available on Thomson for some period less than the following 12 
months: these firms are either delisted or acquired over the 12 month period. For these 26 
 
firms, returns are calculated from the sample fiscal-year-end date to the date of the last 
reported stock trade. Since these firms do not trade for a full 12 months after the sample 
fiscal-year-end, they are referred to as “Inactive” in the table below. Five of the 
“Inactive” firms are identified as non-impairers in our sample year; the other one firm 
impaired in the sample year. 
Finally, seven firms of our sample of 124 have no year-ahead stock returns data 
on either Thomson One Banker or CRSP. Of these seven, we identify four as being 
acquired over the year following the sample year, and another one as being delisted. No 
further data on the other two are available. Five of the seven firms are identified as non-
impairers in our sample year; the other two are impairers. A more detailed analysis of the 
acquisition and delisting status of sample firms in the one-year ahead is provided in Table 
7, which is discussed at the end of this section.   
 
3.3. Association of sample non-impairment with agency-theory predictions 
In Table 4, we report on univariate frequency tests of association between 
goodwill non-impairment and the three contracting-based motives described in §2.3.2, 
specifically, CovDebt, Bonus, and Delist. Since CovDebt is not a binary variable, we 
define an indicator DCovDebt for use in the frequency tests; DCovDebt is set to one if the 
firm has an outstanding net-income or net-worth based covenant.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports a statistically higher proportion of firms with 
DCovDebt=1 among sample non-impairers (78%) than among sample impairers (63%). 
The p-value for this comparison is 0.0867. The proportion of non-impairing sample firms 
whose CEOs are likely to have goodwill-inclusive compensation contracts (Bonus=1) is 
reported in Panel B of Table 4. This proportion (57%) is statistically higher than that of 
impairing sample firms (39%); the p-value is 0.0722. The association of goodwill non-
impairment and Delist is tested in Panel C of Table 4. We find that the proportion of 
firms with Delist=1 among non-impairers in the sample (51%) is statistically 
indistinguishable from that among sample impairers (53%); the p-value is 0.8801. Thus, 
overall, there is evidence that goodwill non-impairment in the sample is associated with 
debt and CEO compensation contracting concerns; while we cannot confirm that non-
impairment is associated with delisting-based concerns.  27 
 
We cannot perform similar univariate frequency tests on the other two agency-
theory-based variables described in §2.3.2, Tenure and AsstPrc, since these variables are 
continuous in nature. We test for their association with goodwill non-impairment in 
multivariate regressions.   
 
3.4. Validating empirical constructs of managers’ private information 
In Table 2, the hypothesis that managers’ private information is positively 
associated with sample non-impairment is not confirmed for any of the five proxies used: 
Fog is associated with goodwill write-offs, but in the opposite direction to that predicted 
by the private information hypothesis. The lack of statistical association among four of 
the five private information proxies in Table 2 can be driven by noise in these proxies. To 
assess the validity of these four proxies (i.e., Repurchase,  Inside,  InfoAsym, and 
Achievement), we test for their association with non-impairment in a similarly 
constructed sample (i.e., firms with market indications of impaired goodwill) under SFAS 
121, the standard that preceded SFAS 142.
20  
In untabulated tests, we find that the frequency of non-impairing firms with 
positive net repurchase activity (36%) is statistically higher than that of impairing firms 
(22%); p-value is 0.0256. Moreover, the proportion of firms with Achievement=1 among 
non-impairers (49%) is statistically higher than that among sample impairers (37%); p-
value of 0.0824. We cannot estimate Inside, and consequently InfoAsym, in the SFAS 121 
sample due to limitations in obtaining reliable insider-buying data from this period.
21 
Thus, overall, we can conclude that non-impairment in the SFAS 121 sample appears to 
be related to managers’ private information as proxied by share repurchases and the use 
of “achievement”-related words. These results suggest Repurchase and Achievement have 
construct validity as proxies for managers’ private information. 
As noted earlier, the nature of goodwill recognition and impairment rules under 
SFAS 121 differ significantly from those under SFAS 142. Specifically, when SFAS 121 
                                                 
20 Specifically, the SFAS 121 sample consists of firms with fiscal years “t” ending between December 1996 
and December 2000 that have: (i) book goodwill; (ii) equity-market-values greater than equity-book-values 
in t-2; (iii) BTM > 1 in t-1; and (iv) BTM > 1 in t, where BTM is calculated after accounting for all non-
goodwill write-offs, but before any goodwill write-off. 
21 Brochet (2010) reports that the informativeness of Form 4 insider-trading filings increases after the SEC 
mandated timelier filings (since August 2002) and electronic filing (since June 2003).  28 
 
was in effect: (1) firms had the option to use the pooling-of-interests method to account 
for acquisitions, thus avoiding goodwill recognition altogether; and (2) goodwill, if 
recognized, was subject to amortization. These conditions imply that the base of book 
goodwill available for impairment at a given point was likely to be lower when SFAS 
121 was in effect. A lower magnitude of impairment can affect incentives to avoid write-
offs. Moreover, if, as the SEC suggested, firms engaged in pooling acquisitions to 
manage earnings (Turner, 1999), the sample of firms with book goodwill under the SFAS 
121 regime can contain companies less prone to earnings management.
22 Accordingly, 
one can construct hypotheses to explain why goodwill non-impairments under SFAS 121 
are more likely to be associated with positive private information, as we find. We do not 
explore explanations for our findings on the SFAS 121 sample since they are outside the 
scope of our study. The purpose of the SFAS 121 tests is simply to validate the constructs 
for private information. 
 
3.5. Pearson correlations between explanatory variables 
The conclusion from the univariate tests described through Table 4 is that 
goodwill non-impairment in the sample of firms under SFAS 142 is associated with 
proxies for debt and compensation contracting concerns, but not with exchange delisting 
concerns or with any proxies for managers’ private information. Construct validity tests 
on the proxies for private information suggest share repurchases and Achievement can 
validly measure managers’ favorable private information. In subsequent tests, we 
examine the determinants of goodwill non-impairment under SFAS 142 in a multivariate 
setting.  
Before describing the multivariate results, in this sub-section, we report Pearson 
correlations between the continuous explanatory variables in the multivariate regressions 
(Table 5).
23 Size is significantly positively associated with CovDebt and the number of 
business segments and significantly negatively associated with HHI and industry leverage 
rank (IndLev). IndLev is also significantly positively associated with HHI. The absolute 
                                                 
22 The academic evidence on the governance characteristics of pooling versus purchase method acquirers 
and on the consequences of pooling versus purchase method acquisitions is consistent with the SEC’s claim 
(e.g., Martinez-Jerez, 2008).  
23 In untabulated frequency tests, we find none of the discrete explanatory variables used in the multivariate 
regressions (e.g., Bonus, Delist, InfoAsym, etc.) are significantly associated with each other. 29 
 
value of the correlation between the two proxies for goodwill allocation flexibility across 
reporting units, ln(Seg) and HHI is 0.8933, consistent with the variables measuring a 
conceptually similar construct (the correlation is negative because allocation flexibility is 
expected to increase in the number of segments and decrease in segment concentration, 
HHI). Finally, UNA is positively associated with CovDebt, suggesting firm leverage in 
the sample is not a good proxy for verifiable assets-in-place (and thereby, supporting the 
use of industry leverage, IndLev, as a proxy for assets-in-place).  
 
3.6. Multivariate results 
  Table 6 reports on multivariate tests of the determinants of non-impairment in the 
SFAS 142 sample. The specification for the multivariate regressions is provided in §2.5. 
Since we do not have data to compute AsstPrc and the content-analyses-based private 
information proxies for all the observations in our sample (see Table 1), we report the 
results both with and without these variables. There are two panels to Table 6, each panel 
with a different explanatory variable representing flexibility in estimating the fair value 
of reporting units’ net assets: UNA in Panel A and IndLev in Panel B. Within each panel, 
there are four regressions that cover the inclusion and exclusion of two sets of 
explanatory variables: first, AsstPrc and the content-analyses-based private information 
proxies, and second, one proxy for goodwill allocation flexibility across reporting units, 
i.e., ln(Seg) or HHI.  
Across all eight regressions in Table 6, none of the proxies for managers’ private 
information are statistically significant (in all tests, statistical significance is inferred at 
least at the two-tail 90% confidence level). Thus, based on the private-information 
proxies employed, the multivariate tests cannot confirm the hypothesis that goodwill non-
impairment under SFAS 142 is associated with managers’ favorable private information 
on future cash flows.  
Among the contracting-based motives for non-impairment, CovDebt, a measure 
of the cost of debt covenant violations, is a negative and statistically significant predictor 
of impairment in the two regressions that use IndLev, AsstPrc, and all the content-
analyses-based private information proxies. The relation between CovDebt and non-
impairment is likely due to managers’ desire to avoid covenant renegotiation. Avoiding 30 
 
renegotiation facilitates wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders, but can also be 
motivated by management reputation concerns (since failure to do so can be perceived as 
managerial incompetence). Further, Bonus, the proxy for CEO’s compensation concerns, 
is a negative and statistically significant predictor of impairment in all four regressions 
that include AsstPrc and the content-analyses-based private information proxies. In 
contrast, we do not find any evidence to suggest that delisting based concerns are 
associated with firms’ decisions on goodwill write-offs.  
Tenure, the measure of CEOs’ concerns on reputational loss from the implications 
of a goodwill write-off, is a negative and statistically significant predictor of impairment 
in all specifications of Table 6. The interpretation—that CEO-reputation concerns 
mitigate the likelihood of goodwill write-offs—is consistent with predictions from 
agency theory and findings in Beatty and Weber (2006). Interpreting the magnitude of the 
coefficient from column (1) of Panel A, Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in 
Tenure is associated with a 5.5% decrease in the magnitude of impairment (as a fraction 
of recorded goodwill).
24 The proxy for managers’ concerns over the equity-asset-pricing 
impact of goodwill impairment, AsstPrc, is insignificant in all four regressions in which it 
appears. Since we attempted to select our sample on market indications of impaired 
goodwill, our sample firms’ stock prices likely already reflect goodwill as impaired, 
mitigating the incentives generated by AsstPrc.  
Among the characteristics predicted by Ramanna (2008) to affect the ability to 
avoid goodwill impairment under SFAS 142, HHI—a proxy for goodwill allocation 
flexibility across reporting units—is significant with the predicted sign in two of four 
regressions in which it appears, specifically, the regressions on the full sample of 124 
firms. In contrast, ln(Seg) is only significant in one of four regressions in which it 
appears, column (1) of Panel A. Further, the proxies representing flexibility in estimating 
the fair value of reporting units’ net assets, UNA and IndLev, are significant in all of the 
Table 6 regressions in which they appear.  To interpret the economic significance of the 
reporting flexibility variables on impairment decisions, consider column (1) of Panel A as 
                                                 
24 To investigate whether the negative association between Imp and Tenure is driven by firms with new 
CEOs (assuming new CEOs are more likely to take goodwill write-offs as part of a big bath), we re-run the 
regressions replacing Tenure with an indicator variable set to one when firm-CEOs have been in office less 
than one year. The indicator variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that the reported results on 
Tenure are unlikely to be driven by new-management induced big baths.  31 
 
an example. Here, a one standard deviation increase in ln(Seg) decreases the proportion 
of goodwill impaired (as a fraction of beginning-of-period assets) by about 2%. Since the 
mean sample firm has about 25% of its assets in goodwill, we can say that a one standard 
deviation increase in ln(Seg) decreases the magnitude of impairment by about 8% of 
recorded goodwill. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in UNA decreases the 
proportion of goodwill impaired by about 2.8% of beginning-of-period assets, or about 
11.24% of recorded goodwill. The interpretation is that impairments decrease with the 
number and size of reporting units and increase with the verifiability of net assets within 
the unit.  
Turning to economic-fundamental variables in the sample, we find the one-year 
buy-and-hold return (BHRet) is a negative predictor of impairments, though this relation 
is not statistically significant in all specifications of Table 6.  When we estimate the 
regression specification across the limited sample for which AsstPrc data are also 
available, BHRet loses its statistical significance. 
To summarize the multivariate results, we find: (1) Tenure—the measure of 
CEOs’ concerns on reputational loss from the implications of a goodwill write-off—and 
proxies representing flexibility in estimating the fair value of reporting units’ net assets—
UNA and IndLev—are reliable predictors of non-impairment; (2) CovDebt—a measure of 
the cost of debt covenant violations, Bonus—the proxy for CEO’s compensation 
concerns, and the proxies for goodwill allocation flexibility across reporting units, i.e., 
ln(Seg) and HHI, are significantly associated with non-impairment in only some 
specifications; and (3) none of the proxies for managers’ private information are 
significantly associated with non-impairment. 
 
3.7. Analysis of firms in the year t+1 
  In Table 7, we report on the acquisition and delisting status of sample firms in the 
year t+1, i.e., the year after our principal year of analysis. Seventy-one percent of the 
sample remain active in year t+1; 14.5% of firms are acquired and another 14.5% are 
delisted. Comparing the frequency of acquisitions, delistings, and active firms across 
evidence of favorable information asymmetry (InfoAsym), we find the following: there is 
little difference in the percentage of firms acquired (15% for InfoAsym=0 and 14% for 32 
 
InfoAsym=1); there is a higher frequency of delistings among non-information-
asymmetry firms (22% for InfoAsym=0 and 4% for InfoAsym=1); and there is a lower 
frequency of active firms among non-information-asymmetry firms (63% for InfoAsym=0 
and 82% for InfoAsym=1). The chi-square statistic for the comparison of these 
frequencies has a p-value of 0.0156. Overall, there is evidence in year t+1 of a greater 
likelihood of delisting and a smaller likelihood of staying active among sample firms 
whose managers are unlikely to have favorable private information. The evidence 
supports the use of InfoAsym as a construct for managers’ private information on future 
cash flows.  
    
4. Conclusion and implications 
We investigate the implementation of SFAS 142, an innovative standard that 
requires managers to estimate the current fair value of goodwill to determine goodwill 
write-offs. Estimates of the current fair value of goodwill rely on unverifiable 
assumptions such as expectations of value to be generated by managers’ future actions. 
Standard setters imply that the fair-value estimates will, on average, allow managers to 
convey private information on future cash flows, while agency theory predicts managers 
(all else equal) will, on average, use the unverifiability in goodwill accounting rules to 
manage financial reports opportunistically. We test these arguments in the paper.  
In a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment (firms with 
book goodwill and two successive years of book-to-market ratios above one), we find the 
frequency of goodwill non-impairment is 69%. We test whether the goodwill non-
impairment can be attributed to managers’ private information on positive future cash 
flows, but we find no evidence to confirm this story. We also investigate whether non-
impairment in the sample under SFAS 142 is associated with motives predicted by 
agency theory to affect management choice. We find some evidence of association 
between goodwill non-impairment and CEO compensation, CEO reputation, and debt-
covenant violation concerns. Finally, we test whether goodwill non-impairment in the 
sample can be explained by factors predicted in prior literature to afford managers greater 
flexibility under the SFAS 142 write-off rules. We find some evidence to this effect.  33 
 
Our results are subject to certain important caveats related to noise in our 
empirical proxies and the selection of our sample. These caveats are discussed in the 
introduction and, more fully, in Section 2 of the paper. With these caveats in perspective, 
we conclude that the paper provides evidence of managers, on average, using the 
unverifiable discretion in SFAS 142 to avoid timely goodwill write-offs in circumstances 
where they have agency-based motives to do so (Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner, 2010). 
The results in the paper highlight the potential costs of unverifiable fair values in SFAS 
142. It is possible that the standard is net beneficial, but we do not find any evidence to 
this effect in our study, nor are we aware of any other formal evidence consistent with 
this possibility.  
Future research can investigate the implementation of SFAS 142 and the 
incidence of goodwill write-offs over a more recent sample period encompassing the 
2008–09 financial crisis. That crisis dramatically altered the capital market environment 
in the U.S. and abroad. A study of goodwill impairment decisions through and after the 
crisis period is likely to be interesting and important to academics and practitioners alike. 34 
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Appendix A 
Sample description and variable definitions 
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have 
goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, 
BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value.  
 
Type Variable  Definition 
Dependent 
Variable  Imp  Goodwill impairment (t) / Assets (t-1) 
Private 
Information 
Motive 
InfoAsym  Dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net 
share repurchase activity or positive net insider buying in year t 
Repurchase  Dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net 
share repurchase activity in year t 
Inside  Dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net 
insider buying in year t 
Achievement  Dummy variable set to one if the proportion of “achievement”-
related words in the firm’s year t 10K is greater than the 
corresponding proportion in its size-match. “Achievement”-
related words are based on the LIWC 2007 dictionary (see 
Appendix B). The “size-match” is a firm in the same 3-digit 
NAICS industry with the closest year t-1 sales.  
Fog  Dummy variable set to one if the Fog Index of the firm’s year t 
10K is greater than 18 (the “unreadable” threshold) 
Contracting 
Motives 
CovDebt  Product of Debt (t) / Assets (t-1) and an indicator if the firm 
has an accounting-based debt covenant 
Bonus  Dummy variable set to one if the firm’s CEO received a cash 
bonus in year t 
Delist  Dummy variable set to one if the firm trades on the NASDAQ 
or AMEX 
Reputation 
Motive  Tenure  Tenure in years of the CEO in year t 
Valuation 
Motive 
AsstPrc  The coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating 
income using at least 16 and up to 20 quarters of data prior to 
year t 
Goodwill 
Reporting 
Flexibility 
ln(Seg)  Natural log of the number of business segments 
HHI  The firm’s Herfindahl Hirschman Index, calculated as the sum 
of the square of the ratios of segment sales to total firm sales 
IndLev  Ind.Lev is the ranked mean leverage of the firm’s industry 
(using 4-digit NAICS codes)  
UNA  The in-sample rank of –1* [Cash + All Investments and 
Advances – Debt – Preferred Equity] ÷ [Assets – Liabilities] 
Control 
Variables 
Size  Log[Assets (t-1)] 
PropGw  Goodwill (t-1) / Assets (t-2) 
BHRet  Buy-and-hold return over year t 
NumQtrBTM>1  Number of quarters in year t with BTM > 1 
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Appendix B 
List of word stems associated with “achievement,” based on the LIWC 2007 
dictionary 
 
abilit* determined  masters  recover* 
able* diligen*  mastery  requir* 
accomplish* domina*  medal*  resolv* 
ace driven  motiv*  resourceful* 
achiev* earn*  obtain*  responsib* 
acquir* effect*  opportun*  reward* 
acquisition* efficien*  organiz*  skill 
adequa* effort*  originat*  skilled 
advanc* elit*  outcome*  skills 
advantag* enabl*  overcome  solution* 
ahead endeav*  overtak*  solve 
ambiti* excel*  perfect*  solved 
approv* finaliz*  perform*  solves 
attain* first persever*  solving 
attempt* firsts  persist*  strateg* 
authorit* founded  plan  strength* 
award* founder*  planned  striv* 
best founding  planner*  strong* 
better fulfill*  planning  succeed* 
bonus* gain*  plans  success* 
capab* goal*  potential*  super 
celebrat* hero*  power*  superb* 
challeng* honor* practice  surviv* 
champ* honour*  prais*  team* 
climb* ideal*  presiden*  top 
closure importan*  pride  triumph* 
compet* improve*  prize*  unbeat* 
conclud* improving  produc*  victor* 
conclus* incentive*  proficien*  win 
confidence initiat*  progress  winn* 
confident king*  promot*  wins 
confidently lead*  proud*  won 
conquer* lesson*  purpose*  work   
conscientious* limit*  queen  workabl* 
control* master  queenly  worked 
create* mastered  rank  worker* 
creati* masterful*  ranked  working* 
crown* mastering  ranking  works 
determina* mastermind*  ranks   
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for all variables in the sample 
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have 
goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, 
BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. Imp is goodwill impairment (t) / Assets (t-1). 
InfoAsym is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net share repurchase activity or 
positive net insider buying in year t. Repurchase is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive 
net share repurchase activity in year t. Inside is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net 
insider buying in year t. Achievement is a dummy variable set to one if the proportion of “achievement”-
related words in the firm’s year t 10K is greater than the corresponding proportion in its size-match. 
“Achievement”-related words are based on the LIWC 2007 dictionary (see Appendix B). The “size-match” 
is a firm in the same 3-digit NAICS industry with the closest year t-1 sales. Fog is a dummy variable set to 
one if the Fog Index of the firm’s year t 10K is greater than 18 (the “unreadable” threshold). CovDebt is the 
product of Debt (t) / Assets (t-1) and an indicator if the firm has an accounting-based debt covenant. Bonus 
is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s CEO received a cash bonus in year t. Delist is a dummy 
variable set to one if the firm trades on the NASDAQ or AMEX. Tenure is the tenure in years of the CEO 
in year t. AsstPrc is the coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating income using at least 16 
and up to 20 quarters of data prior to year t. ln(Seg) is the natural log of the number of business segments. 
HHI is the firm’s Herfindahl Hirschman Index, calculated as the sum of the square of the ratios of segment 
sales to total firm sales. IndLev is the ranked mean leverage of the firm’s industry (using 4-digit NAICS 
codes). UNA is the in-sample rank of –1* [Cash + All Investments and Advances – Debt – Preferred 
Equity] ÷ [Assets – Liabilities]. Size is Log[Assets (t-1)]. PropGw is goodwill (t-1) / Assets (t-2). BHRet is 
buy-and-hold return over year t. NumQtrBTM>1 is number of quarters in year t with BTM > 1. 39 
 
 
Type Variable  N  Median  Mean  Standard  Dev. 
Dependent 
Variable  Imp  124 0  0.0467  0.1219 
Private 
Information 
Motive 
InfoAsym  124 0  0.4113  0.4941 
Repurchase  124 0  0.2419  0.4300 
Inside  124 0  0.2097  0.4087 
Achievement  118 1  0.5593  0.4986 
Fog  118 1  0.7203  0.4507 
Contracting 
Motives 
CovDebt  124 0.1341  0.1778  0.1863 
Bonus  124 1  0.5161  0.5018 
Delist  124 1  0.5161  0.5018 
Reputation 
Motive  Tenure  124 4  5.5262  5.6349 
Valuation 
Motive  AsstPrc  91 5.7645  11.6929 16.2306 
Goodwill 
Reporting 
Flexibility 
ln(Seg)  123 0.6931  0.7075  0.6632 
HHI  123 0.7679  0.7459  0.2564 
IndLev  124 1192  1163  636 
UNA  124 63  63  36 
Control 
Variables 
Size  124 5.3504  5.6107  2.0851 
PropGw  124 0.1409  0.2562  0.4639 
BHRet  124 -0.0720 0.0505  0.6273 
NumQtrBTM>1  124 4  3.4919  0.8014 
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Table 2 
Association of goodwill impairment with private information proxies  
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-
market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. InfoAsym is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net share repurchase activity or 
positive net insider buying in year t. Repurchase is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net share repurchase activity in year t. Inside is a 
dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net insider buying in year t. Achievement is a dummy variable set to one if the proportion of 
“achievement”-related words in the firm’s year t 10K is greater than the corresponding proportion in its size-match. “Achievement”-related words are based on 
the LIWC 2007 dictionary (see Appendix B). The “size-match” is a firm in the same 3-digit NAICS industry with the closest year t-1 sales. Fog is a dummy 
variable set to one if the Fog Index of the firm’s year t 10K is greater than 18 (the “unreadable” threshold). 
 
Panel A: Goodwill impairments in year t  
 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
InfoAsym=0 50  
  23   73 
InfoAsym=1 36  15  51 
Total 86  38   124 
% with positive 
private 
information 
42%  39%   41% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.8034. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Goodwill impairments in year t among firms with only one 
business segment 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
InfoAsym=0 22  
  11   33 
InfoAsym=1  14  5   19 
Total 36  16   52 
% with positive 
private 
information 
39%  31%   37% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.5975. 
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Panel C: Goodwill impairments in year t when private information is 
measured using positive net share repurchase activity 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
Repurchase=0 65  
  29   94 
Repurchase=1  21  9   30 
Total 86  38   124 
% with positive 
repurchases  24%  24%   24% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.9298. 
 
 
Panel E: Goodwill impairments in year t when private information is 
measured using the relative proportion of “achievement”-related words in 
the Form 10K 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
Achievement =0  35   
  17   52 
Achievement =1  46    20    66 
Total 81  37   118* 
% with higher 
relative 
achievement 
57%  54%   56% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.7812. 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Goodwill impairments in year t when private information is 
measured using positive net insider buying 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
Inside=0 67  
  31   98 
Inside=1  19  7   26 
Total 86  38   124 
% with positive 
repurchases  22%  18%   21% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.6430. 
 
 
Panel F: Goodwill impairments in year t by readability of Form 10K (as 
measured by the Fog Index) 
 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
Fog=0 18  
  15   33 
Fog=1 63  22   85 
Total 81  37   118* 
% with higher 
Fog  78%  59%   72% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.0397. 
 
* Six firms are omitted because they did not file Form 10Ks within eight 
months of their fiscal-year end. 42 
 
Table 3 
Analysis of one-year-ahead stock returns by sample firms’ impairment status 
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-
market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. “Active, CRSP” refers to firms that continue to have stock returns data on CRSP one year past the sample 
year. “Active, Not CRSP” refers to firms that are dropped from CRSP in the post sample-year, but that have one-year-ahead stock prices available on Thomson 
One Banker. “Inactive” are firms that are acquired or delisted in the post sample-year, as inferred from price data on Thomson. “No data” refers to firms without 
any stock price coverage in CRSP or Thomson in the post sample-year.  
  
      Non-Impairers     Impairers 
Category N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
Active, CRSP  64  0.2293  0.1239  32  0.1721  0.1331 
Active, not CRSP  12  1.6588  0.4113  3  -0.4229  -0.2400 
Inactive 5  0.5395  0.6434  1  0.4688  0.4688 
No data  5  .  .  2  .  . 
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Table 4 
Association of goodwill impairment with agency-related proxies 
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-
market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. DCovDebt is an indicator if the firm has an accounting-based debt covenant. Bonus is a dummy variable set 
to one if the firm’s CEO received a cash bonus in year t. Delist is a dummy variable set to one if the firm trades on the NASDAQ or AMEX.  
 
Panel A: By presence of accounting-based debt covenants 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
DCovDebt=0 19  
  14   33 
DCovDebt=1 67  24  91 
Total 86  38   124 
% with debt 
covenant 
incentives 
78%  63%   73% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.0867. 
 
Panel C: By accounting-based delisting requirements 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
Delist=0 42  
  18   60 
Delist=1 44  20   64 
Total 86  38   124 
% with delisting 
incentives  51%  53%   52% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.8801. 
Panel B: By CEO’s receipt of an accounting-based bonus 
  no 
impairment   impairment   Total 
Bonus=0 37  
  23   60 
Bonus=1 49  15   64 
Total 86  38   124 
% with 
compensation 
incentives 
57%  39%   52% 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.0722. 
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Table 5 
Pearson correlations of continuous explanatory variables (p-values in parentheses) 
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-
market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. CovDebt is the product of Debt (t) / Assets (t-1) and an indicator if the firm has an accounting-based debt 
covenant. Tenure is the tenure in years of the CEO in year t. AsstPrc is the coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating income using at least 16 and 
up to 20 quarters of data prior to year t. ln(Seg) is the natural log of the number of business segments. HHI is the firm’s Herfindahl Hirschman Index, calculated 
as the sum of the square of the ratios of segment sales to total firm sales. IndLev is the ranked mean leverage of the firm’s industry (using 4-digit NAICS codes). 
UNA is the in-sample rank of –1* [Cash + All Investments and Advances – Debt – Preferred Equity] ÷ [Assets – Liabilities]. Size is Log[Assets (t-1)]. PropGw is 
goodwill (t-1) / Assets (t-2). BHRet is buy-and-hold return over year t. NumQtrBTM>1 is number of quarters in year t with BTM > 1. 
 
 
   CovDebt Tenure  AsstPrc ln(Seg)  HHI IndLev  UNA  Size  PropGw BHRet 
Tenure  -0.0378 
(0.6770) 
AsstPrc  0.0793 0.1303 
(0.4553) (0.2185) 
ln(Seg)  0.0541 -0.0561 -0.1137 
(0.5523) (0.5381) (0.2858) 
HHI  -0.0503 0.0595 0.1069  -0.8933 
(0.5808) (0.5132) (0.3161) (<.0001) 
IndLev  -0.0027 0.0518 0.0169  -0.1792 0.2183 
(0.9764) (0.5680) (0.8736) (0.0474) (0.0153) 
UNA  0.6215  -0.0298 0.0546  -0.0704 0.0575 0.0029 
(<.0001) (0.7425) (0.6072) (0.4391) (0.5278) (0.9741) 
Size  0.2421 -0.0872 -0.0178  0.2222 -0.2469 -0.3488  0.0691 
(0.0068) (0.3357) (0.8673) (0.0135) (0.0059) (<.0001) (0.4458) 
PropGw  -0.0602 -0.0945 -0.0185 -0.0634  0.0767  0.1335 -0.0145 -0.0732 
(0.5065) (0.2967) (0.8616) (0.4862) (0.3990) (0.1393) (0.8733) (0.4192) 
BHRet  -0.0963 -0.0330 -0.1265 -0.0206 -0.0272  0.0687 -0.1338 -0.1735 -0.0271 
(0.2873) (0.7159) (0.2323) (0.8213) (0.7656) (0.4482) (0.1386) (0.0539) (0.7655) 
NumQtrBTM>1  0.0321 0.0363 0.0957 0.1214  -0.1188  -0.0510 0.0464 0.1011  -0.1153  -0.0547 
(0.7231) (0.6891) (0.3668)  (0.181) (0.1906) (0.5737) (0.6086) (0.2638) (0.2024) (0.5462) 
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Table 6 
Multivariate regression of goodwill impairment on the hypothesized determinants  
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have 
goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, 
BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. Imp is goodwill impairment (t) / Assets (t-1). 
InfoAsym is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net share repurchase activity or 
positive net insider buying in year t. Repurchase is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive 
net share repurchase activity in year t. Inside is a dummy variable set to one if the firm exhibits positive net 
insider buying in year t. Achievement is a dummy variable set to one if the proportion of “achievement”-
related words in the firm’s year t 10K is greater than the corresponding proportion in its size-match. 
“Achievement”-related words are based on the LIWC 2007 dictionary (see Appendix B). The “size-match” 
is a firm in the same 3-digit NAICS industry with the closest year t-1 sales. Fog is a dummy variable set to 
one if the Fog Index of the firm’s year t 10K is greater than 18 (the “unreadable” threshold). CovDebt is the 
product of Debt (t) / Assets (t-1) and an indicator if the firm has an accounting-based debt covenant. Bonus 
is a dummy variable set to one if the firm’s CEO received a cash bonus in year t. Delist is a dummy 
variable set to one if the firm trades on the NASDAQ or AMEX. Tenure is the tenure in years of the CEO 
in year t. AsstPrc is the coefficient from regressing a firm’s price on its operating income using at least 16 
and up to 20 quarters of data prior to year t. ln(Seg) is the natural log of the number of business segments. 
HHI is the firm’s Herfindahl Hirschman Index, calculated as the sum of the square of the ratios of segment 
sales to total firm sales. IndLev is the ranked mean leverage of the firm’s industry (using 4-digit NAICS 
codes). UNA is the in-sample rank of –1* [Cash + All Investments and Advances – Debt – Preferred 
Equity] ÷ [Assets – Liabilities]. Size is Log[Assets (t-1)]. PropGw is goodwill (t-1) / Assets (t-2). BHRet is 
buy-and-hold return over year t. NumQtrBTM>1 is number of quarters in year t with BTM > 1. All 
standard errors are robust to White’s correction. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 90, 95, and 
99 percent confidence level, respectively.  
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Panel A: Unverifiability of net assets measured with UNA 
       (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)   
Effect  Parameter        Est.        Est.        Est.        Est.    
       (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)   
                                        
  Intercept    0.2853  ***   0.1544  **   0.2046  **   0.1118  * 
       (0.0992)     (0.0710)     (0.0911)     (0.0657)   
                         
Private 
Info. 
Motive 
InfoAsym  -   -0.0213      -0.0015      -0.0231      -0.0033    
     (0.0198)     (0.0161)     (0.0203)     (0.0167)   
                       
Achievement  -        -0.0076          -0.0077   
          (0.0156)          (0.0156)   
                       
Fog  +/-        -0.0200          -0.0173   
          (0.0200)          (0.0195)   
                                        
Contract. 
Motives 
CovDebt  -  0.0263      0.0201      0.0224      0.0190    
     (0.0492)     (0.0392)     (0.0494)     (0.0405)   
                       
Bonus  -   -0.0190     -0.0334  **   -0.0175     -0.0332  ** 
     (0.0223)     (0.0165)     (0.0226)     (0.0163)   
                       
Delist  -   -0.0340     -0.0131     -0.0321     -0.0116   
     (0.0341)     (0.0165)     (0.0343)     (0.0164)   
                                        
Reputation 
Motive 
Tenure  -   -0.0025  *   -0.0024  **   -0.0025  *   -0.0024  ** 
     (0.0014)     (0.0011)     (0.0014)     (0.0011)   
                         
Valuation 
Motive 
AsstPrc  -           0.0002              0.0002    
          (0.0005)          (0.0004)   
                                        
Goodwill 
Reporting 
Flexibility 
ln(Seg)  -   -0.0301  *   -0.0148             
     (0.0155)     (0.0126)             
                       
HHI  +             0.0742  **   0.0378   
               (0.0367)     (0.0308)   
                       
UNA  -   -0.0008  **   -0.0007  ***   -0.0008  **   -0.0007  *** 
     (0.0004)     (0.0002)     (0.0004)     (0.0002)   
                         
Control 
Variables 
Size       -0.0084      -0.0045      -0.0081      -0.0040    
     (0.0059)     (0.0046)     (0.0060)     (0.0047)   
                       
PropGw    0.0346     0.1687  ***   0.0341     0.1657  *** 
     (0.0276)     (0.0397)     (0.0269)     (0.0403)   
                       
BHRet     -0.0537  *   0.0076     -0.0522  *   0.0092   
     (0.0273)     (0.0190)     (0.0272)     (0.0189)   
                       
NumQtrBTM>1     -0.0227     -0.0069     -0.0228     -0.0071   
     (0.0150)     (0.0116)     (0.0150)     (0.0113)   
                                        
  Adj R2    0.1296     0.2850     0.1267     0.2847   
   N        124        86        124        86    
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Panel B: Unverifiability of net assets measured with IndLev 
       (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)   
Effect  Parameter        Est.        Est.        Est.        Est.    
       (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)     (S.E.)   
                                        
  Intercept    0.1838  **   0.0419     0.1217     0.0145   
       (0.0848)     (0.0583)     (0.0791)     (0.0608)   
                         
Private 
Information 
Motive 
InfoAsym  -   -0.0183      0.0027      -0.0198      0.0012    
     (0.0192)     (0.0159)     (0.0196)     (0.0164)   
                       
Achievement  -        -0.0012          -0.0017   
          (0.0150)          (0.0149)   
                       
Fog  +/-        -0.0198          -0.0182   
          (0.0191)          (0.0188)   
                                        
Contracting 
Motives 
CovDebt  -   -0.0772      -0.0773  *   -0.0771      -0.0781  * 
     (0.049)     (0.0433)     (0.0491)     (0.0434)   
                       
Bonus  -   -0.0245     -0.0418  **   -0.0231     -0.0417  ** 
     (0.0234)     (0.0182)     (0.0238)     (0.0181)   
                       
Delist  -   -0.0130     0.0014     -0.0121     0.0027   
     (0.0295)     (0.0170)     (0.0297)     (0.0170)   
                                        
Reputation 
Motive 
Tenure  -   -0.0027  *   -0.0026  *   -0.0027  *   -0.0026  * 
     (0.0014)     (0.0014)     (0.0014)     (0.0014)   
                         
Valuation 
Motive 
AsstPrc  -           0.0002              0.0002    
          (0.0005)          (0.0004)   
                                        
Goodwill 
Reporting 
Flexibility 
ln(Seg)  -   -0.0241     -0.0117             
     (0.0149)     (0.0120)             
                       
HHI  +             0.0602  *   0.0252   
               (0.0361)     (0.0306)   
                       
IndLev  +   2.60E-05  *   3.20E-05  **   2.50E-05 *   3.20E-05 ** 
     (0.0000)     (0.0000)     (0.0000)     (0.0000)   
                         
Control 
Variables 
Size       -0.0029      0.0018      -0.0028      0.0019    
     (0.0051)     (0.0046)     (0.0052)     (0.0047)   
                       
PropGw    0.0282     0.1518  ***   0.0279     0.1492  *** 
     (0.0265)     (0.0406)     (0.0260)     (0.0411)   
                       
BHRet     -0.0458  *   0.0167     -0.0448  *   0.0178   
     (0.0274)     (0.0203)     (0.0273)     (0.0205)   
                       
NumQtrBTM>1     -0.0235     -0.0046     -0.0236     -0.0049   
     (0.0153)     (0.0113)     (0.0153)     (0.0111)   
                                        
  Adj. R2    0.1114     0.2796     0.1097     0.2769   
   N        124        86        124        86    
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Table 7 
Analysis of sample firms in the year t+1 
The sample is the 124 firms on COMPUSTAT with fiscal year “t” between 2003 and 2006 that have 
goodwill > $1m in year t-2, equity-book-value < equity-market-value in year t-2, BTM > 1 in year t-1, 
BTM > 1 in year t, and goodwill > 0 at the beginning of year t. BTM is the ratio of equity-book-value plus 
goodwill impairment (if any) to equity-market-value. InfoAsym is a dummy variable set to one if the firm 
exhibits positive net share repurchase activity or positive net insider buying in year t. “Acquired” means 
that the firm was merged into another corporation. “Delisted” means that the firm filed for bankruptcy, was 
liquidated, was forced to trade over-the-counter, or was otherwise involuntarily delisted. “Active” means 
that the firm is still actively traded and regularly files financial reports with the SEC.  
 
  InfoAsym=0  InfoAsym=1   Total 
Acquired 11  (15%)   
  7 (14%)    18 (14.5%) 
Delisted  16 (22%)    2 (4%)    18(14.5%) 
Active  46 (63%)    42 (82%)    88 (71%) 
Total  73   51   124 
The chi-square statistic for the table has a p-value of 0.0156. 
 
 
 